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Attempting to Find Some Common Ground for Illegal
Aliens, and The Board's Ability to Award Back Pay:
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB
By Stephen M. Hernandez*
Dating back to 1943, the National Labor Relations Board has
granted rights guaranteed to employees under the National Labor
Relations Act to illegal aliens. In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.
v. NLRB ("Hoffman"), the United States Supreme Court attempted to
put some closure on the issue of whether illegal alien employees
were entitled to reinstatement into their previous employment
positions and whether they were entitled to back pay for the time they
had been unemployed.' The United States Supreme Court seemed to
settle the issue of back pay by holding that illegal aliens were not
entitled to pay that could have been earned because they were
violating a federal law banning illegal entry into the United States.2
Although the issue of back pay was settled, how this will affect
actions taken by federal agencies remains to be seen. The author
investigates both the Supreme Court's analysis of the decision and its
future impact.
* The author is a J.D. Candidate, 2004, at Pepperdine University School of
Law. This is evidence that "I can do all things through Christ who strengthens me."
I am forever grateful and thankful to my Mom, Pops, Artie, Michael, Jessica, and
Jena for their undaunted love and support throughout. I love you all. This casenote
is also dedicated to all those who have come to the United States (including my
ancestors) in search of better lives.
I. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
2. Id.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a company in a major U.S. city is met with the threat
of a union representing its employees. In learning that some of its
employees are joining the union and promoting its cause, the
company questions them and asks them to cut all ties to the union.
When the employees refuse, they are fired from the company.
This situation was relatively common prior to the establishment
of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act"). 3 While the
Act seeks to prevent such practices and even dictates sanctions for
such behavior, they continue to occur regardless of the threat of
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") penalties.4
Suppose that the same small company knowingly hires several
employees who are illegal immigrants from Mexico. The company
hires them for various reasons and pays them low wages knowing
that they will either soon be discovered to be in the U.S. illegally by
the proper authorities, or that the illegal aliens will be too afraid to
report any unfair practices that their employer places upon them.
This second scenario was also frequently played out prior to the
establishment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
("IRCA"). The IRCA sought to make it illegal for employers
"knowingly to hire undocumented workers or for employees to use
fraudulent documents to establish employment eligibility."5  It is
under similar circumstances from which Hoffman arose in that an
employee who had been wrongfully discharged because of his
association with a labor union after he was reinstated and subject to
back pay revealed that he had been in the United States illegally.
An early NLRB case paved the way for the application of the
protection of the NLRA to illegal aliens.6 The Board stated in dicta
that national policy prohibited a limitation of NLRB protection to an
3. The original Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1982) (enacted in 1935), has been
amended by the Taft-Hartley Act. 29 U.S.C. § § 141-197 (1982) (enacted in 1947).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1982) (setting out the right of employees to come
together and define unfair labor practices of employer interference).
5. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 141 (citing Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 314
NLRB, at 685-86).
6. U.S. Bedding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 382 (1943) (holding that a company
opposed to a scheduled representation election because the majority of the
members of the petitioning union were black was improper).
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employee based on that employee's "race, creed, color, or national
origin.",7 This was finally affirmed by the Supreme Court in Sure-
Tan Inc. v. NLRB ("Sure-Tan"), yet the Court refused to extend the
application of the Act to back pay. 8 Finally, in Hoffman the Supreme
Court decided that "allowing the Board to award back pay to illegal
aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions
critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA." 9 This
ruling brings to light the issue of whether or not the United States
immigration laws overstep their boundaries and if they do so at the
cost of promoting unfair and unjust practices, such as free labor. The
Supreme Court had a difficult time wrestling with the issue, which
was made evident by the fact that the case was decided on a five-to-
four basis. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the opinion of the
court, was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas.' 0 Justice Breyer dissented in an opinion in which Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined."
This casenote will provide a brief overview of the development of
the NLRB and the role that Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs")
play in the implementing of the Board's policies and the parameters
of the Board's control. This casenote will also seek to investigate the
development and impact of the NLRA and the IRCA on labor
relations involving illegal immigrants' rights to back pay.
Additionally, this casenote will analyze both the majority and
dissenting opinions of Hoffman, discussing their strengths and
weaknesses. Finally, it will conclude with an analysis of the
repercussions of the Court's decision on the current and future status
of the illegal alien worker.
7. Id. at 388.
8. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) ("Sure-Tan").
9. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 151.
10. Id. at 137.
11. Id. at 153.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Impact of Policies on Illegal Aliens
The NLRA came into effect on July 5, 1935,12 to promote
policies such as: the practice of collective bargaining, the free flow of
interstate commerce, and the freedom of workers to organize.13 This
congressional act formed- the NLRB which was intended to be both
the governing and implementing body of the Act. 14
For a business to come under the governing powers of the NLRB,
the Board must have jurisdiction over that business. 15  The
requirement of section 141 is that the business "effect commerce."' 16
The employee must additionally come under the protection of the
Act. Employee, as used in section 151, is broadly defined in section
152(3). 17 The issue of who is an employee under the Act falls within
"the usual administrative routine of the Board., 18
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1935), reprinted in 2 N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 3270-79 (1940).
13. 29 U.S.C. §141 (1982). See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 29-32 (1936) (holding that the policy of the Act is to "eliminate these
causes of obstruction of the free flow of commerce").
14. For a complete outline of the structure and power of the National Labor
Relations Board, see T. KHEEL, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR LAW (1984).
15. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 30-32 (stating that the Board's
authority does not reach all industrial employer and employee relationships, but
only those relationships that affect commerce).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1982). The Act then defines the meaning of affecting
commerce in section 152(7). "The term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce,
or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce or having led
or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free
flow of commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1982). See also Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. at 31-32.
17. 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (1982) (stating that: "The term 'employee' shall
include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer . . . and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment .. ") Id.
18. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944) (quoting Gray v.
Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941)).
The basis for including illegal aliens as employees was formed in
1943.'9 The Board resolved that, as a matter of national policy,
limitations on the protection of an employee would not be based
upon "race, creed, color or national origin."
20
The passage of another Act, the IRCA, 21 had other repercussions,
such as limited antidiscrimination provisions, penalties against
employers of undocumented workers, and an amnesty program
legalizing aliens who had been in the United States unlawfully prior
to January 1, 1982.22 Before IRCA's enactment, it was legal to hire
unauthorized workers. The IRCA made it unlawful to knowingly
hire illegal aliens and created penalties for those who knowingly
violated the Act.23 Under the IRCA, employers must check certain
documents which prove citizenship or immigration status for all
employees.
24
IRCA's goal is not to punish illegal aliens, but rather employers,
by implementing sanctions upon employers for knowingly employing
illegal aliens.25 The IRCA allows for a "graduated scale" of penalties
for violations of the statute that includes the issuance of cease and
desist orders and fines. 26 However, "the employer sanctions scheme
19. U.S. Bedding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 382 (1943). See supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
20. Id. at 388.
21. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 8, 18, 20, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
22. David A. Martin, Major Issues in Immigration Law, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
1987, available at 1987 WL 123658 (1987).
23. 8 U.S.C. §1324a (2000).
24. Id.
25. Maria L. Ontiveros, To Help Those Most in Need: Undocumented
Workers' Rights and Remedies Under Title VII, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 607, 616 (1993-1994). The Act does not punish undocumented workers
who seek or take employment. Id. at 612. However, this fact does not mean that
undocumented workers will not be subject to penalties for being in the country
illegally under immigration laws.
26. For the first offense, fines range from $250 to $2000 for each alien hired;
for a second offense, fines are between $2000 and $5000 for each alien employed;
and, a third offense results in penalties of $3000 to $10000 for each alien hired. 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5). The failure to complete and maintain proper paperwork
carries a fine of $100 to $1000 for each individual with respect to whom the
violation occurred. Id. at § 1324a(e)(5). Employers are sanctioned with criminal
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRBSpring 2003
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has done little to rectify the 'embarrassing secret' of immigration-
that illegal immigrants play an invaluable role in our daily lives. 27
President George W. Bush has been critical of imposing penalties on
employers for hiring "somebody [who] is willing to do ... work...
others in America aren't willing to do."28
Even after IRCA's establishment, the NLRB continued to hold
that limited back pay awards were proper. 29 Back pay awards were
limited to the period between the discharge and the date the workers
"are reinstated or when, after a reasonable period of time, they are
unable to produce the documents enabling the [employer] to meet its
obligations under IRCA to verify their eligibility for employment in
the United States." 30 Thus, Hoffman seems to have quelled the issue
of illegal aliens' right to back pay.31
B. The Board's Decisions
The NLRB's view that illegal aliens are employees within section
2(3) of the Act 32 is fairly modem, dating back only to 1973. 33
penalties for repeated violations; criminal penalties are fines of up to $3000 for
each unauthorized alien and/or six months imprisonment. Id. at § 1324a(f)(1).
27. Elizabeth M. Dunne, Comment, The Embarrassing Secret of Immigration
Policy: Understanding Why Congress Should Enact an Enforcement Statute for
Undocumented Workers, 49 EMORY L.J. 623, 626-27 (2000).
28. The Beltway Boys: Political Headlines and Tip Sheet (FOX News
television broadcast, Sept. 8, 2001), available at 2001 WL 7785884.
29. 12 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR, I LR-38,235.1 (2001) (discussing
A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408 (1995), aff'd, 134 F.3d 50
(2d Cir. 1997)).
30. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408 (1995).
31. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149. Though the circuit courts have generally held
limited back pay and reinstatement remedies to be in line with immigration laws,
there is an inconsistency about how to fashion such awards, if they are awarded at
all. Courts grant back pay and other remedies at their discretion, based on the fact
that IRCA penalizes the employers and not the undocumented aliens. However,
courts and the NLRB pay little attention to the fact that the INS may eventually
penalize the illegal aliens by deporting them. Whether courts and agencies follow
Hoffman or distinguish the case on its facts remains to be seen. However, prompt
action by Congress would eliminate the need to make such decisions.
32. See, e.g., Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 1094, 1095 (1973)
(eligibility of aliens to vote in Board elections "well established"); Seidmon,
Seidmon, Henkin & Seidmon, 102 N.L.R.B. 1492, 1493 (1953) (eligibility of
Despite several years of consistently holding that illegal aliens are
employees within section 2(3), and thus deserved the protection of
the Act, the Board has failed to provide a sound analysis for this
determination. 34  In determining that illegal aliens are employees
under the Act, the Board has simply deferred to previous Board
decisions which stood either for the same proposition,35 or for the
proposition that non-citizenship is not a proper reason for being
excluded from a labor organization, such as a union, or
disqualification from voting in elections conducted by the Board.
36
The Board has thus held that the NLRA granted protection to illegal
aliens' use of section 7 rights without formally articulating the
reasons for granting such protection. 37 This has also been the case in
representation cases. 38 All that the Board's rulings amounted to was
reiteration, not analysis.
39
In 1980, the Board finally recognized in Duke City Lumber, Inc.
v. NLRB 40 that its past decisions had only rationalized the Act's
coverage in terms of alienage per se, instead of on the basis of the
legal or illegal status of such aliens in determining exclusions from
labor organizations. In Duke City Lumber a Texas employer hired
185 employees to work at his two sawmills.4 1 All employees were
aliens to vote in Board elections "well established"); Dan Logan & J.R. Paxton, 55
N.L.R.B. 310, 315 n. 12 (1944) (Board held that non-citizenship does not disqualify
employees from voting in elections because the Act does not differentiate citizens
from non-citizens and not making such a distinction effectuates the purposes of the
Act).
33. Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1973).
34. Casenote, Labor Law-Illegal Aliens Are Employees Under 29 U.S.C.
§152(3) (1976) And May Vote in Union Certification Elections: NLRB v. Sure Tan,
Inc., 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978), 10 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 747, 751 n.34 (1979).
35. See, e.g., Sun Country Citrus, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 700, 709 (1984) (illegal
aliens possess §7 rights and may not be discriminatorily treated for their exercise,
in violation of §8(a)(1)); La Mousse, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 37 (1981) (employee's
illegal alien status is irrelevant in a discriminatory discharge case); Apollo Tire Co.,
Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1627, 1628 n.1 (1978) (employee's illegal alien status is
irrelevant in a discriminatory discharge case).
36. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
37. See, supra note 35 and accompanying text.
38. Id.
39. See supra note 33.
40. 251 N.L.R.B. 53, 53 (1980).
41. Id.
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allowed to join the labor union, with the exception of the illegal alien
employees.42 The reason for the denial of coverage, the labor
organization argued, was that there were insufficient common
interests amongst the employees.43 The Board determined that under
the NLRA no distinctions can be made between citizens and non-
citizens. 44 Thus there was no viable reason to deny employees from
a labor organization based on their immigration status.45
Trying to define its decision not to differentiate illegal alien
employees from other employees, the Board noted that no evidence
existed that showed that the employees, whether legal or illegal,
lacked a community of interest with regard to wages, hours, benefits,
job duties, or terms and conditions of employment. 46 The fact that
the aliens were illegally present in the United States was not relevant
because of the lack of Federal legislation prohibiting the hiring of
illegal aliens,47 and it was not the Board's duty to change the
obligations imposed by the NLRA in order to follow immigration
policies. 4
8
These examples of NLRB practices demonstrate that the Board
has routinely granted illegal aliens coverage under the Act without
giving any clear justification. Not until Duke City Lumber did the
Board explain that no exclusion of illegal aliens existed within the
Act. In order to assist in the interpretation of the definition of
'employee' in the NLRA, this casenote shifts to decisions of courts of
appeals.
C. Previous Circuit Court Decisions
Before Sure-Tan only two circuit courts of appeals had dealt with
the issue of whether illegal alien employees deserved 'employee[]'
status under the NLRA. The first court to do so was the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Sure-Tan,
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 53-54.
48. Id. at 54.
Inc. and Surak Leather Co. (Surak Leather),49 and the second was the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v.
Apollo Tire Co., Inc.50
Surak Leather dealt with a challenge to a union authorization
campaign5 1 which preceded the events that led to Sure-Tan, despite
the cases having no procedural relation. 52  In Surak Leather the
controversy surfaced when, after the Union garnered the votes of six
out of the seven employees eligible to vote, 53 the employer denied the
union the right to collectively bargain.54 The Board concluded that
illegal aliens were employees under the NLRA, and thus had the
ability to vote in a Board election.55
Following this Board decision, 6 the employer appealed the
certification of the Union and argued that it was improper because a
majority of the employees who voted were illegal aliens.57  The
Seventh Circuit upheld the Board's decision in that illegal aliens
were employees under the Act and thus were eligible to vote in a
certification election. 58  In its analysis, the court first noted the
traditional and consistent interpretation by the Board that aliens are
covered as employees by the Act.59 Second, the court noted the
broadness of the Act's language which failed to specifically exclude
aliens.60 Third, the court stated that the Board's interpretation would
be upheld unless there are 'compelling indications that it is wrong.'
61
The court finally determined that granting illegal aliens NLRA
coverage was in line with federal immigration policy because there
were no immigration statutes which prohibited illegal aliens either
49. Surak Leather, 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978).
50. Apollo Tire Co., Inc., 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1979).
51. Surak Leather, 583 F.2d at 356.
52. NLRB v. Sure-Tan Inc., 672 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'd in part and
remanded, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
53. 583 F.2d at 357.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56 Id.
57. Id. at 358.
58. Id. at 359.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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from employment or from voting in a Board election. 62 The court
concluded that to decline to certify the Union on the grounds that it is
composed of illegal aliens, would only foster illegal immigration,
because employers would have an additional incentive to hire illegal
aliens and thus limit unionization. 63
This same question of the status of illegal aliens under the NLRA
was addressed by the Ninth Circuit in N.L.R.B. v. Apollo Tire Co.64
This case involved several alien employees who were fired by their
employer in response to the employees' filing of a complaint with the
Secretary of Labor alleging that the employer had failed to pay its
employees overtime wages. 65 The court affirmed the Board's finding
of unfair labor practices and its issuance of cease and desist orders
along with reinstatement orders. 66 The issue before the court of
appeals in Apollo Tire was whether the Board's prohibition of
evidence of the employees' undocumented immigration status was
improper.67 The court enforced the Board's order,68 holding that the
Board had not erred in not allowing into evidence the illegal status of
the employees. 69 The Apollo Tire court used similar reasoning as that
of the Surak Leather court in determining that illegal aliens were
employees within the meaning of the Act. 70 The court sided with the
Surak Leather decision that the Board's consistent interpretation of
the Act as including aliens is appropriate and that giving illegal aliens
the protection of the NLRA would best promote the policies
contained in our immigration laws. 71
Thus, before the Supreme Court's decision in Sure-Tan, the courts
that ruled on this issue consistently held that illegal alien workers
were "employees" under the NLRA. The courts based their decisions
on judicial deference to the Board's historic practice, and the lack of
62. Id.
63. ld. at 360.
64. 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1979).
65. Id. at 1181-82.
66. Id. at 1182, 1184. The unfair labor practices were held to be violations of
section 8 (a)(1) and (4) of the Act.
67. 604 F.2d at 1181.
68. Id. at 1184.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
any clear exclusion of illegal aliens within the language of the NLRA
itself, or any viable conflict with immigration legislation.72  In
conclusion the above mentioned court of appeals' decisions
considered their holdings to be in line with the immigration laws'
policy of curtailing illegal immigration.73  Although the Surak
Leather and Apollo Tire courts heavily relied on the doctrine of
judicial deference to the NLRB, these decisions looked past the
indecisive legislative and procedural history of the Act in granting
illegal aliens employee status under the Act.
74
D. Illegal Aliens' Rights in the Workplace
Aliens within the borders of the United States are granted
substantial rights.75 These rights have traditionally included those
afforded to United States workers under the NLRA and the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").76 Both acts include unauthorized
aliens within their definitions of employee.77
Some legislators viewed the policy of attaching legal employee
status to illegal aliens as a conflict between labor and immigration
law. 78 The NLRB, the Department of Labor, and reviewing courts,
however, supported application of traditional employee protections to
unauthorized aliens, noting the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA") was silent regarding the employment status of unauthorized
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See 42 U.S.C. §1981(a) (2003) (acknowledging equal benefit of laws
applies to all persons within jurisdiction of United States); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 210 (1982) (recognizing aliens within United States have right to educate
children in public schools).
76. See In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding immigration
status of employee irrelevant in the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") wage suit).
77. The FLSA defines employee as "any individual employed by an
employer." 29 U.S. C. § 203 (e)(1) (2003). The NLRA provides that the term
"employee" shall include "any employee...." Id. § 152(3) (emphasis added).
78. 132 Cong. Rec. S 16,880 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Alan
Simpson). Senator Alan Simpson commented that "the law of the United States is
the most bizarre of any law in the country. It simply means it is legal to hire an
illegal, but it is illegal for the illegal to work .... And is that not absurd?" Id.
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aliens. 79  The Supreme Court in Hoffman acknowledged such
conflict, however, and again raised the question as to how federal
labor laws should be applied in the future.80
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts of the Case
In Hoffman, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. hired Jose Castro
for the position of machine operator. 81 Prior to his hiring, Mr. Castro
presented documents that seemed to suggest that he was legally
authorized to work in the United States. 82 Mr. Castro, along with
other employees, soon joined the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and
Plastic Workers of America ("AFL-CIO") and helped in the
organizing and distribution of authorization cards to coworkers. 83
After discovering the activities of their employees, Hoffman laid off
Castro and the other employees involved.84
After charges were filed, the Board concluded that Hoffman had
violated § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.85 The Board then ordered and
Hoffman agreed to "(1) cease and desist from further violations of
the NLRA, (2) post a detailed notice to its employees regarding the
remedial order, and (3) offer reinstatement and back pay to the four
affected employees." 86  The parties then proceeded to a hearing
before an ALJ to finalize the amount owed to each discharged
employee. Mr. Castro then testified that he had been in the United
States illegally and was not authorized to work.87 Mr. Castro then
testified that he had gained employment including employment
79. See Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525
(1988) (exempting employers of illegal aliens from penalty).
80. Hoffman, 535 U.S. 144-45.
81. Id. at 139.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. Section 158(a)(3) of the NLRA forbids discrimination "in regard to
hire or tenure of employment ... to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization[.]" 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2003).
86. Hoffman, 535 U.S. 140-41.
87. 314 N.L.R.B. 683, 685 (1994), 1994 WL 397901, at **5.
gained after being laid off from Hoffman, a driver's license, and a
social security card by using a friend's birth certificate. 88 Using this
testimony, the ALJ determined that the Board was precluded from
granting Mr. Castro back pay or reinstatement of his position because
it would be contrary to prior Supreme Court precedent 89 and the
IRCA. 90
Four years after the ALJ's decision, "the Board reversed with
respect to back pay." 91 After denying Hoffman's petition for review
and rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's
order, as modified.92
B. Lower Court's Analysis and Reasoning
Judge Tatel,93 who wrote for the court, disagreed with the
argument that Sure-Tan should control the outcome of Hoffman:
"[Iln computing back pay, the employees must be deemed
'unavailable' for work (and the accrual of back pay therefore tolled)
during any period when they were not lawfully entitled to be present
and employed in the United States." 94 Sure-Tan involved workers
who had left the United States to avoid deportation, 95 something Mr.
Castro never did. Judge Tatel argued that this sentence applied only
to instances in which undocumented workers reentered the country
88. Id.
89. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (holding that the NLRA
applied to illegal aliens as well).
90. 314 N.L.R.B., at 685-86 (makes it unlawful for employers knowingly to
hire undocumented workers or for employees to use fraudulent documents to
establish employment eligibility), 1994 WL 397901k, at **4-**6.
91. 326 N.L.R.B. 1060 , 1998 WL 663933 (citing its earlier decision in
A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 1995 WL 803434, the
Board determined that "the most effective way to accommodate and further the
immigration policies embodied in IRCA is to provide the protections and remedies
of the NLRA to undocumented workers in the same manner as to other
employees." 326 N.L.R.B. at 1060.
92. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 208 F.3d 229 (2000).
93. Chief Judge Edwards and Judges Williams, Rogers, Garland, and
Silberman joined Judge Tatel.
94. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 237 F.3d 639, 642 (2001).
95. Id. at 642, 645.
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illegally to claim back pay awards.96  The court claimed that
Hoffman's interpretation conflicted with "other language" in Sure-
Tan that clearly substantiated the Board's award of reinstatement and
back pay to undocumented workers. 97 Sure-Tan, according to the
court, failed to address "whether undocumented workers remaining at
work in the United States throughout the back pay period are entitled
to back pay awards. "98
The court then rejected the argument that a back pay award
would conflict with the IRCA's goal of restricting the hiring of illegal
workers. 99 They relied on New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc. v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 00 which held that with regard to NLRA
enforcements, the Board must "minimize[] the impact of its actions
on the policies of . . . other statute[s]," like those set forth in the
IRCA.'' As in this case, the Board needed "to accommodate the
policies of another statutory regime,"' 0 2 it must demonstrate a
"careful analysis" of the competing regimes and must explain "why
the action taken minimizes ... its intrusion into policies that are more
properly the province of another agency or statutory regime."' 
03
The lower court believed that Congress' goal was not to limit the
NLRA, "even indirectly."' 10 4 The Board's decision was thus affirmed,
holding that to "fully enforce the requirements of its own statute,"
10 5
the Board must be granted the deterrent capability of back pay.
Judge Tatel agreed with and cited to the Board's previous decision in
96. Id. at 644.
97. Id. The majority further argued that if the Court had intended to preclude
all remedies for undocumented workers in Sure-Tan. Id.
98. Id. at 645.
99. Id. at 646.
100. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 854 F.2d
1338 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
101. Id. at 1367.
102. Hoffman, 237 F.3d at 647 (quoting New York Shipping, 854 F.2d at 1367)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. (quoting New York Shipping, 854 F.2d at 1370 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
104. Id. at 646.
105. Id. at 647 (quoting New York Shipping, 854 F.2d at 1367) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group10 6 which suggested that the denial of
back pay would allow employers to "simply fire undocumented
workers who try to organize and then raise 'the unlawful immigration
status ... in retaliation for protected activities'; employers might even
'consider the penalties of IRCA a reasonable expense more than
offset by the savings of employing undocumented workers or the
perceived benefits of union avoidance."" 0 7  The court also agreed
with the Board's argument that limiting remedies may even injure
legally eligible workers. This would occur because "the continuous
threat of replacement with powerless and desperate undocumented
workers would certainly chill the American and authorized alien
workers' exercise of their... rights" under the NLRA.108
C. One Final Decision
The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari, 0 9 on
the employer's request, to review the awarding of back pay. On
March 27, 2002, in a five to four decision," 10 the Court reversed both
the Board's and the court of appeals' decision holding that the
awarding of back pay to an undocumented alien who had never been
legally authorized to work in the United States is foreclosed by
federal immigration policy, as expressed by Congress in the IRCA. 1
106. 320 N.L.R.B. 408 (1995).
107. Hoffman, 237 F.3d at 647 (quoting A.P.R.A. Fuel, 320 N.L.R.B. at 415).
108. Id. (quoting A.P.R.A. Fuel, 320 N.L.R.B. at 414) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Judge Tatel also addressed Hoffman's equal protection argument
that by awarding back pay to undocumented workers, "the Board treats illegal
aliens more favorably than documented workers[J" Id. at 650 (quoting Brief for
Petitioner at 33) (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Tatel rejected this
argument because Hoffman lacked standing to assert an equal protection claim on
behalf of documented workers and because Hoffman pointed to no supporting
evidence. Id.
109. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 533 U.S. 976 (2001).
110. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 139.
111. Id.
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IV. SUMMARY OF OPINION
A. Majority
1. Board's Authority to Design Remedies
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist"12 initially
examined the Board's ability to grant remedies under the NLRA. He
resolved that the Board did not have authority to grant remedies that
contravene other, important statutory schemes," 3 and stated that,
"[T]hough generally broad," the Board's remedy granting power "is
not unlimited."'"14 The Court had "consistently set aside awards of
reinstatement or back pay to employees found guilty of serious illegal
conduct in connection with their employment."" 5  Another area
where the Board lacks discretion is in policy arenas in which it lacks
expertise: the Court noted that, since Southern Steamship Co. v.
NLRB, 116 it had "never deferred to the Board's remedial preferences
where such preferences potentially trench upon federal statutes and
policies unrelated to the NLRA."117
The Court then examined whether the Board's award defied other
federal policies. The Court investigated Sure-Tan's "express
limitation of back pay to aliens 'lawfully entitled to be present and
employed in the United States.""' 8 Instead of deciding whether the
"isolated sentences . . . definitively control" the case,9 the Court
approached the issue "through a wider lens, focused ... on a legal
landscape now significantly changed." 120 The Court determined that
the IRCA "forcefully made combating the employment of illegal
112. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist.
113. Id. at 143-46.
114. Id. at 143.
115. Id.
116. 316U.S. 31 (1942).
117. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 143; see also Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S.
31(1942).
118. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 146 (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S.
883, 903 (1984)).
119. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147.
120. Id.
aliens central to [t]he policy of immigration law."' 2 1  The
requirement of potential employees presenting documents,' 22 IRCA's
"employment verification system", attempted to "deny employment
to aliens who (a) are not lawfully present in the United States, or (b)
are not lawfully authorized to work in the United States."' 123 It is a
crime under IRCA, the Court held, for an illegal alien to tender
fraudulent documents, and employers must immediately terminate
any employee discovered to be unauthorized, or who presents
fraudulent documents. 
24
2. Board's Back Pay Award Impact on the IRCA
Finally, the Court sought to determine whether the back pay
remedy by the Board impermissibly violated the IRCA. 125 Noting
that "it is impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain
employment in the United States without some party directly
contravening explicit congressional policies,"' 26 the Court concluded
that "recognizing employer misconduct but discounting the
misconduct of illegal alien employees . . . subverts" the IRCA.
127
The awarding of back pay "not only trivializes the immigration
laws," but "encourage[s] the successful evasion of apprehension by
immigration authorities, condone[s] prior violations of the
immigration laws, and encourage[s] future violations. '128 The
unemployed individual may not legally perform his duty to mitigate
damages by attaining other employment. 129  Also, "traditional
remedies" such as conspicuous workplace notices and cease-and-
121. Id. (quoting INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183,
194 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2000).
123. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(a)(1), (h)(3).
124. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a) (criminalizing
subversion of the employment verification system).
125. Id. at 148-52.
126. Id. at 148.
127. Id. at 150.
128. Id. "Castro thus qualifies for the Board's award only by remaining inside
the United States illegally." Id.
129. Id.
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desist orders are "sufficient to effectuate national labor policy."
'1 30
The Court ultimately concluded that "allowing the Board to award
back pay to illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory
prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in the
IRCA.'
13 1
B. Dissent
1. Misanalysis of the Board's Role
Many of the same arguments were made by the dissent to reach a
very different result. Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent, argued
that the NLRB back pay remedy promotes the goals of both the
NLRA and the IRCA. 132 The dissent reasoned that the back pay
remedy is crucial in deterring violations of the NLRA. 133 If the
NLRB was denied the remedy of back pay, an important "weapon[]
in its remedial arsenal," would be lost if it could only apply "future-
oriented obligations upon law-violating employers ..... 134 This in
turn would allow, "employers [to] conclude that they can violate the
labor laws at least once with impunity." 135
The dissent also argued that the back pay remedy supports federal
immigration policy. The IRCA employment restrictions seek to
destroy "the attractive force of employment, which like a 'magnet'
pulls illegal immigrants towards the United States."'136 However,
according to the dissent, the possibility of back pay would not affect
the decision to immigrate illegally. 137 Justice Breyer, on the other
hand, points out a possible problem. Preventing back pay awards
would lower the cost of labor law infractions and increase "the
employer's incentive to find and to hire illegal-alien employees[,]"
130. Id. at 152 (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 904).
131. Id. at 151.
132. Id. at 153.
133. Id. at 153-54.
134. Id. at 153.
135. Id. at 154.
136. Id. at 155 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 45 (1986)).
137. Id. at 153-55.
perhaps with "a wink and a nod.'' 138 The dissent also notes that the
IRCA was established to destroy the remedial capabilities of the
Board.139
In conclusion the dissent reasoned that, apart from the above
mentioned arguments, 140 the Court had a duty of deference to the
Board under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc."41  According to the dissent, the Board acted with
cognizant and "discriminating awareness of the consequences of its
action on the immigration laws."'14 2  Even the Attorney General,
"responsibl[e] for immigration law enforcement," concurred with the
Board's conclusion. 143 Thus, the dissent would have affirmed the
NLRB's "reasonable" interpretation. 144
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Majority
1. General Introduction
The majority in Hoffman seem to integrate two issues into the
opinion in order to develop one result as to the issue of whether an
illegal alien is entitled to back pay. The two major questions that
seem to arise in the opinion are: what type of discretion does the
Board have in making decisions that affect U.S. immigration policy;
and whether giving illegal aliens the same access and rights to our
138. Id. at 156.
139. Id. at 156-57.
140. Justice Breyer also analyzed at length the Court's holding in ABF Freight
System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317 (1994), which upheld a back pay award to an
unlawfully discharged employee who committed perjury during the Board's
enforcement proceedings. The ABF Freight decision, according to Justice Breyer,
supports his alternative holding. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 157-58 (Breyer, J.
dissenting).
141. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
142. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 161 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 371 U.S. 156, 174 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Id. at 152, 158, 161.
144. Id. at 159-61.
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labor policies promotes the U.S. immigration policy surmised in the
IRCA.
2. Board's Discretion in Making Decisions
This case is not the first time in which the Court has limited the
Board's discretion, which is "generally broad."' 145  Although
generally the Court has broad discretion, it "is not unlimited."'146
Since the Board's creation, the Court has "consistently set aside
awards of reinstatement or back pay to employees found guilty of
serious illegal conduct in connection with their employment."' ' 47
"Two years later the Board awarded reinstatement with back pay to
five employees whose strike on a ship led to a mutiny in violation of
federal law." The Court followed this by setting aside the award. 148
Since Southern S.S. Co. the court has said that "where the
Board's chosen remedy trenches upon a federal statute or policy
outside the Board's competence to administer, the Board's remedy
may be required to yield."1 49  Thus, the Court has precluded the
Board from enforcing orders that have been found to conflict with the
Bankruptcy Code.150 The Court has also "rejected claims that federal
antitrust policy should defer to the NLRA"'15' and "precluded the
145. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, 344 U.S. 344, 346-47 (1953).
146. Southern S.S. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 316 U.S. 31, 46-47 (1942).
147. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 143 (2002). In NLRB v. Fansteel, the Board
reinstated along with back pay employees who engaged in a "sit down strike" that
led to a confrontation with local law enforcement officials. The Supreme Court set
aside the award, saying:
We are unable to conclude that Congress intended to compel
employers to retain persons in their employ regardless of their unlawful
conduct, to invest those who go on strike with an immunity from
discharge for acts of trespass or violence against the employer's property,
which they would not have enjoyed had they remained at work. 306 U.S.
240, 255 (1939).
148. Southern S.S. Co., 316 U.S. at 47 (1942) (stating that "[i]t is sufficient for
this case to observe that the Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the
policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore
other and equally important congressional objectives.").
149. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147.
150. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527-34 (1984).
151. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers, 421 U.S. 616, 626 (1975).
Board from selecting remedies pursuant to its own interpretation of
the Interstate Commerce Act."' 
52
The Court further limits the Board's ability to enforce orders by
going against the Board and the Court of Appeals analysis of the case
and eventually reversing.' 53 Both parties rely primarily on Sure-
Tan's express limitation of back pay to aliens "lawfully entitled to be
present and employed in the United States."'1 54 All agree that this
suggests that Castro is not entitled to back pay.' 55 However, the
Board and the Court of Appeals by awarding back pay allude to the
idea that this limitation is applicable solely to "aliens who left the
United States and thus cannot claim back pay without lawful
reentry.' ' 156 The other approach 157 adopted by the Court, holds that
Sure-Tan simply means that any illegal alien that is not "lawfully
entitled to be present and employed in the United States" does not
have a claim for back pay. 158
As applied to this case, the Board rationalized that granting
Castro back pay would "reasonably accommodate" the IRCA, and
would not run contrary to the IRCA's goals.' 59 The Board contends
that since the back pay period "was closed as of the date Hoffman
learned of Castro's illegal status, Hoffman could have employed
Castro during the back pay period without violating the IRCA."'
' 60
The Board further argues that although the IRCA made the wrongful
use of documents illegal, "it did not make violators ineligible for
back pay awards or other compensation flowing from employment
secured by the misuse of such documents."'
161
The Court found that the main flaw in the Board's analysis was
that they sought to override Congress' goal of making it against the
law for an alien to gain employment through the presentation of false
152. Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 108-110 (1958).
153. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 137.
154. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 903.
155. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147.
156. Id.
157. Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1118-1121 (7th Cir.
1992).
158. Id.
159. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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documents. 162 The Court eventually concludes that granting back
pay to individuals who are in the United States illegally runs contrary
to the IRCA, and oversteps the bounds of administrative power that
the Board is given. 163
This case brings to light the limits that the Supreme Court has put
on the Board's ability to make decisions and its administrative power
along with the possible repercussions of interference with Board
decisions, which will be discussed further in the note. This decision
also brings to light that the Board's future decisions may take one of
two approaches. That is, they may either be more sound and stricter
decisions when it comes to U.S. labor policy or they may continue to
clash with congressional motives.
3. Back pay's Role in the Promotion of U.S. Labor Policy
Despite Congress' attempt to have the NLRA and IRCA coexist
and complement one another, this goal still remains in doubt. While
undocumented workers are seemingly granted the protection of
employment and labor laws because they are employees, 164 the
circuit courts have yet to fashion one consistent remedy that does not
clash with these laws.' 65  Enforcement of penalties for labor and
employment violations is in constant conflict with an effective
immigration policy. Many legal authorities, including the majority in
162. Id. (stating, "The Board asks that we overlook this fact and allow it to
award back pay to an illegal alien for years of work not performed, for wages that
could not lawfully have been earned, and for a job obtained in the first instance by
a criminal fraud.")
163. Id. (stating, "We find, however, that awarding back pay to illegal aliens
runs counter to policies underlying IRCA, policies the Board has no authority to
enforce or administer.")
164. See supra note 23.
165. Compare NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 50,
56 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that illegal workers could collect back pay under the
NLRA), and Local 512 Warehouse and Office Workers' Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d
705, 723 (9th Cir. 1986) (same holding), with Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB,
976 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that illegal workers could not collect back
pay under the NLRA).
Hoffman, have yet to conclusively determine whether the granting of
remedies is consistent with immigration law in light of the IRCA. 1
66
As mentioned above the Board relied on earlier cases to come to
the conclusion that Mr. Castro was entitled to back pay. 167 In ABF
Freight, the Board adopted a "rigid rule that employees who falsely
testify under oath automatically forfeit NLRA remedies."1 68 In Sure-
Tan, the court limited back pay to aliens "lawfully entitled to be
present and employed in the United States."' 69 The Board interpreted
this ruling as suggesting that this was limited to aliens who departed
the United States, and presently cannot claim back pay without legal
entry into the United States. 170 The Court rejects these analyses and
takes a broader perspective in reaching the decision that it reaches. 17
1
The Court had to examine whether or not the decision
"entrenched" upon a Congressional statute that was outside of the
scope of governance for the Board and if so how.' 7 2 In 1986, two
years after Sure-Tan, Congress promoted a new policy in
immigration law by enacting the IRCA, 173 which sought to prohibit
the employment of illegal aliens in the United States and made the
fight against employment of illegal aliens central to "[t]he policy of
immigration law."'
' 74
166. Hoffman, 525 U.S. at 149 ("[A]warding back pay to illegal aliens runs
counter to policies underlying IRCA....").
167. Id. at 143-46.
168. ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 325 (1994) (The
Supreme Court held that despite employee's false testimony under oath before an
ALJ, the Board did not abuse its discretion in declining to adopt a "rigid rule"
precluding reinstatement when former employee so testifies, or in ordering
reinstatement with back pay upon finding that discharge was actually motivated by
anti-union animus).
169. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 146 (quoting Sure-Tan. 467 U.S. at 903).
170. Id.
171. Id. (stating "[f]or whether isolated sentences from Sure-Tan definitively
control, or count merely as persuasive dicta in support of petitioner, we think the
question presented here better analyzed through a wider lens, focused as it must be
on a legal landscape now significantly changed").
172. Id.
173. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2003).
174. INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 n.8
(1991).
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This prohibition took the form of an "employment verification
system"' 75 that was formed in order to prohibit aliens from gaining
employment that "(a) are not lawfully present in the United States, or
(b) are not lawfully authorized 176 to work in the United States ....
To enforce it, [the] IRCA mandates that employers verify the identity
and eligibility of all new hires by examining specified documents
before they begin work."' 177  If the applicant fails to provide this
documentation, he or she cannot be hired. 178
Under the IRCA "it is impossible for an undocumented alien to
obtain employment in the United States without some party directly
contravening explicit congressional policies."' 79 If an employer hires
an unauthorized worker, either unknowingly or if the employee
becomes unauthorized after gaining employment, the employer has a
duty to discharge the worker upon uncovering the employee's
status. 180  An employer who fails to act or violates the IRCA is
subject to civil fines' or may be subject to criminal prosecution.' 82
The employee or the illegal alien also faces some stiff penalties
for an IRCA violation.' 83  The undocumented alien also faces
criminal charges if they seek to gain employment by undermining the
verification system by producing fraudulent documents. 8 4 Thus, it
prohibits the undocumented alien from producing or using "any
forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely made document" or "any
document lawfully issued to or with respect to a person other than the
possessor" to gain employment in the United States.' 8' Aliens who
175. § 1324a(a)(1).
176. For an alien to be "authorized" to work in the United States, he or she
must possess "a valid social security account number card," or "other
documentation of employment in the United States which the Attorney General
finds, by regulation, to be acceptable for purposes of this section". §
1324a(b)(C)(i-ii).
177. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147-48.
178. § 1324a(a)(1).
179. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148.
180. § 1324a(a)(2).
181. § 1324a(e)(4)(A).
182. § 1324(a)(f)(1).
183. § 1324c.
184. § 1324c(a).
185. §§ 1324c(a)(1)-(3).
use or attempt to use such fraudulent documents are subject to fines
and criminal prosecution. 1
86
The Court rationalized the actions by the employee as being ones
that violated IRCA's employment verification system through the
production by Mr. Castro of false documents to obtain employment
with Hoffman. 187 The Court goes on to allude to the fact that the
Board's decision of allowing employer misconduct over the policy
goals of the IRCA runs contrary to the principles for which it was
established. 188
B. The Dissent
1. The Board's Discretion
The dissent attacked the Court's interference with the Board's
discretionary power. This was made evident when the Court stated
"the [Court] cannot. deny that the Board has especially broad
discretion in choosing an appropriate remedy for addressing such
violations."'1 89 The Court also brings to life earlier decisions that
alluded to the Board's decision making ability. 190
Back pay provided the Board with some possibility of deterrence
to the employer. 191 The dissent alludes to the idea that without the
possibility of deterrence, the Board is left with the ability to impose
only "future-oriented obligations upon law-violating employers."'' 92
The dissenting opinion brings forth the idea that without the ability to
impose an order for back pay upon the employers, the employers in
186. § 1546(b).
187. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148-49.
188. Id. At 149-50 (stating "[flar from 'accommodating' IRCA, the Board's
position, recognizing employer misconduct but discounting the misconduct of
illegal alien employees, subverts it.").
189. Id. at 153.
190. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613, n. 32 (stating that the
"Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its choice of
remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts.").
191. Hoffrnan, 535 U.S. at 154.
192. Id.
Spring 2003 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB
202 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 23-1
turn would feel inclined to violate the labor laws with some
"impunity."'' 93
The dissent attempts to distinguish U.S. labor policy along with
the Board's ability to enforce it, and the U.S. Immigration Policy,
and how the immigration statute should not impede upon the Board's
ability to make decisions.' 94 The dissent tries to divide this case into
two different issues: first, that the employer, Hoffman, violated U.S.
Labor Policy by discharging an employee for joining a union, and
second that the illegal activity by Mr. Castro should be handled
separately by separate criminal or civil penalties.' 95 They seem to
argue that the Board's discretion should be left for implementing
labor polices, which in this case they tried to do by forcing back pay
on an employer who violated U.S. Labor policy by discharging an
employee for joining a union. 196
Thus, the dissenting opinion seems to suggest that the majority
overstepped its bounds in its denial of back pay to Mr. Castro. The
discretion that has been given to the Board was intended to be broad
and the decision in Hoffman makes that less clear to the outside
observer. The Court's taking of power from the Board may have
repercussions in the sense that this may create a disincentive for the
Board to make decisions that may seem controversial.
2. Misanalysis of the Prior Cases
The dissent suggests that the two prior cases upon which the
Court relied to reach its decision, Fansteel9 7 and Southern S.S.
Co.,' 98 offer little basis for the Court's decision. The dissent seems
193. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. at 415, n. 38
(stating that without potential back pay order employer might simply discharge
employees who show interest in a union "secure in the knowledge" that only
penalties were requirements "to cease and desist and post a notice.").
194. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. I at 58 (1986).
195. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 156-58.
196. Id. (citing prior case where "the Court unanimously held that the Board
'retained broad discretion' to remedy the labor law violation through a back pay
award, while leaving enforcement of the criminal law to ordinary perjury-related
civil and criminal penalties." ABF Freight System, Inc., 510 U.S. at 325).
197. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
198. Southern S.S. Co., 316 U.S. at 47.
to focus on the underlying circumstances, which were very different
from the circumstances involved in the present case. 199 In those two
cases, the Court held that the illegal conduct by the employees gave
the employer "good cause" for discharge, thus cutting off any remedy
that might have been justified. by reinstatement or back pay.200 The
dissent distinguishes those two cases from the present one in that
Hoffman did not concern a discharge "for good cause., 20 1  The
discharge in this case was an unfair labor practice by Hoffman and
not an illegal act, at least at the time, by Mr. Castro.20 2
3. The Denial of Back pay to Illegal Aliens Runs Contrary to
Immigration Policy
The dissent's main argument and underlying analysis is that the
implementation of a back pay policy "will not interfere with the
implementation of immigration policy" but would instead help "to
deter unlawful activity that both labor laws and immigration laws
seek to prevent., 20 3 The dissent argues that the awarding of back pay
serves "important remedial purposes," such as deterrence, and victim
compensation. 20 4  It would prevent, they argue, employers from
hiring employees, whom the employers could hold something over
their heads, for example: "We'll call the INS if you cause any
trouble," without being subject to stiff penalties.20 5
The dissent also attacks the language of U.S. Immigration
laws.20 6 There are restrictions on an employer employing an alien
whom they know is here illegally, and that the alien may not pass
false records but "the statutes' language itself does not explicitly state
how a violation is to effect the enforcement of other laws, such as the
199. In both cases, the employees had responded with unlawful acts of their
own, a sit-in and a mutiny, respectively. Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 252; Southern S.S.
Co., 316 U.S. at 32-36.
200. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 158.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 158-59.
203. Id. at 153.
204. Id. at 154.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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labor laws." 207 Once again the dissent tries to distinguish between
the violation of labor laws; Hoffman's firing of Castro because of
association with Union, versus the violation of immigration laws,
Castro's fraudulent representation of documents. The dissent tries to
emphasize the Board's role as labor law enforcer versus immigration
law enforcer.
The dissent also suggests that the awarding of back pay to an
illegal immigrant does not detract from the Immigration Policy of
maintaining jobs in the U.S. market.208 Justice Breyer, in his opinion,
makes this evident when he states, "[t]o permit the Board to award
back pay could not significantly increase the strength of this
magnetic force, for so speculative a future possibility could not
realistically influence an individual's decision to migrate
illegally." 20 9  Rather, the dissent argues, it would increase this
"magnetic force" by giving the employer more of an incentive to
search out illegal-alien employees. 210
The dissent concludes by stating that the Court failed to meet its
goal of making labor laws applicable to illegal aliens, "in order to
ensure that 'there will be no advantage under the NLRA in preferring
illegal aliens' and therefore there will be 'fewer incentives for aliens
themselves to enter."'211
VI. IMPACT
A. General Impact
The decision by the majority in Hoffman has two profound
impacts: First, the decision gives the Board a new focus on labor
decisions that involve and may infringe upon statutory law, and
second, it reaffirms the importance of a sound immigration policy.21 2
Hoffman limits, reexamines, and establishes the role that the Board
207. Id.
208. Id. (stating "the general purpose of the immigration statute's employment
prohibition is to diminish the attractive force of employment, which like a 'magnet'
pulls illegal immigrants towards the United States.").
209. Id.
210. Id. at 156.
211. Id. (quoting Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 893-94).
212. Id. at 151-52.
has in making decisions. The impact that this will have on future
Board decisions is yet to be known. One possibility is that the Board
can become so strict in its interpretation of the laws that it could
become a one-sided administrative board. Another possibility is that
people will find ways to side-step the administrative power of the
Board. Time will be the true measure of this decision on the Board.
The impact that this decision will have on the workforce, both
employer and employee, is still at issue. The majority resolved the
immediate problem with the best possible solution while effectuating
the policies and purposes of both the NLRA and the INA. The
dissent raised several concerns over the implementation of the
majority's decision, calling for a stronger stance to prevent future
unfair labor practices by employers'2 13 There are concerns that
employers may try to side-step labor polices by hiring illegal aliens,
underpaying them, threatening them, or discharging them unfairly for
exercising a right that is given to every other employee in the United
States.
214
The majority seems satisfied in its decision, suggesting that this is
the best way to combat the illegal activity by both the employer and
the employee. Allowing back pay to illegal aliens would, according
to the majority, "encourage the successful evasion of apprehension
by immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the
immigration laws, and encourage future violations. '" 21 5
Before Hoffman, courts were not given a clear set of rules and
policies concerning undocumented workers in the United States.
They faced the problem of interpreting several federal statutes.
enforced by different federal agencies. 216 The back pay issue may
213. Id. at 156.
214. See Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
215. Id. at 151.
216. If the NLRB and courts continue to ignore workers' immigration status
when fashioning a remedy, they will be closing their eyes to the purposes and
objectives of federal immigration laws. As a result, the NLRB and the courts will
encourage illegal immigration and undocumented labor. However, if the NLRB
and the courts deny all rights and remedies to undocumented workers, they will be
closing their eyes to the purposes and objectives of federal labor and employment
law, and, as a result, they will be encouraging employer violations and poor
working conditions. Thus, courts are left with little choice, choose one law or the
other to follow, or do the legislature's job and fashion remedies according to a
judicially-integrated labor, employment and immigration policy.
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have been resolved, but this decisions' affect on actions taken by
federal agencies has yet to have been determined. 1 7 An integrated
policy that effectively and efficiently meets the goals of both
immigration and labor laws is the only solution.
B. Impact on Board's Discretion
Although many view Hoffman as a "status" and rights of
undocumented workers case, the decision could also be seen as a
close examination of the National Labor Review Board's power.
21 8
Though the Court refused to enter the "bog of logomachy" that is
brought on when one attempts to distinguish remedial from punitive
damages, this limitation on the Board's decision making ability may
have precluded what, to some, may have been the most logical and
positive solution of the Hoffman matter: the award of back pay to a
third party, such as a mediator.219 Though the Court realizes the lack
of punitive authority amongst the Board, it has seldom decided cases
by characterizing an award as impermissibly punitive. 220  With
greater remedial flexibility, third party awards would be the Board's
most sensible choice.221 This type of remedy would neither grant a
windfall on an undocumented worker nor benefit the illegal actions
of the employer.
Hoffman exemplifies the increasing trend of the placement of
limits on the board's power and role in dictating remedies. The
Board's attempt to "effectuate the policies of [the Act]" ran afoul
217. The uncertainty is made evident when courts grant back pay and other
remedies at their discretion, based on the fact that IRCA penalizes the employers
and not the undocumented aliens. However, courts and the NLRB pay little
attention to the fact that the INS may eventually penalize the illegal aliens by
deporting them. Whether courts and agencies follow Hoffman or distinguish the
case on its facts remains to be seen. However, prompt action by Congress would
eliminate the need to make such decisions.
218. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 137.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 152 n.6 (recognizing the punitive-remedial distinction but declining
to decide the case on that basis).
221. This accords with the practice of many states that have sought, in civil
litigation, to direct punitive damages to state agencies. For a summary of such
statutes, see BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 616-18 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
with another legislative role. 222  The Court's own stance on
interference with agency decisions was made clear when the Court
stated, "any 'perceived deficien[cy] in the NLRA's existing remedial
arsenal,' must be 'addressed by congressional action,' not the
courts." 223 Thus, this seems to question the Court's interference with
decisions by the Board, as those made in Hoffman. The decision, in
turn, may have cleared nothing up.
VII. CONCLUSION
The goals of deterring violations and compensating victims have
long been at the forefront of both labor and employment remedies.
The goal of victim compensation through reinstatement and back pay
has traditionally been available to people "available for work., 224
Hoffman attempted to clarify this goal, in holding that illegal,
undocumented workers were not entitled to back pay. 225
To accomplish the federal labor and employment agencies goals
of enforcing their respective policies, they must maintain the ability
to punish employers that harm their employees, whether documented
or not. In designing solutions to these problems, both the courts and
agencies have been unable to adequately find a middle ground
between immigration and labor law. 226 The INS and the legislature
must work together in addressing this problem.
The reason many illegal aliens come to the United States is
because of our job market.227 Thus, a clear and viable federal policy
is crucial. Since they fear being deported they are hesitant to report
222. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000).
223. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 152 (quoting Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 904).
224. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 883.
225. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 137.
226. Some federal agencies and courts do not distinguish between workers
based on documentation status and award the same remedies to both documented
and undocumented workers, thereby ignoring immigration policy. Others make a
distinction and limit remedies, thereby ignoring the polices behind labor and
employment statutes.
227. Dunne, supra note 7, at 631.
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unfair labor practices, which in turn creates a willingness to employ
undocumented workers because of their susceptibility.
228
Congress must take adequate steps to reconcile immigration
policy with labor policy that reflects and bestows full rights and
remedies to all workers, while simultaneously alleviating the problem
of illegal immigration. As we have seen, such a balance may be hard
to accomplish. Without balanced policies, employers will continue
to employ undocumented workers because the savings garnered by
employing them outweighs the penalties imposed by immigration
laws, and illegal immigrants will continue to violate these
immigration laws because of their illusive search for a better
future.
22 9
Only a viable labor, employment, and immigration law solution
can effectively reconcile the purposes of federal labor and
employment law with immigration law. It is time for Congress to
build a bridge for opportunity and stop encouraging exploitation of
the system both by illegal aliens and the employers.
228. For example, in August 1995, government officials raided a garment
sweatshop in El Monte, California, where Thai immigrants were held in conditions
similar to slavery and forced to sew for only $1.60 per hour. George White,
Workers Held in Near-Slavery, Officials Say, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1995, at AI.
229. Dunne, supra note 7, at 626.
